英语文献翻译，求高手啊 ！！！

Question

The wormhole attack is a severe attack against ad hoc routing protocols that is particularly challenging to defend against; it can potentially cripple a range of ad hoc network routing protocols. In the wormhole attack, an attacker records packets (or bits) at one location in the network, tunnels them to another location, and retransmits them from there into the network. Most existing ad hoc network routing protocols that lack a mechanism to defend them against the wormhole attack would be unable to find routes longer than one or two hops, which severely disrupts communication.
If a wormhole attacker tunnels all packets through the wormhole honestly and reliably, no harm is done; the attacker actually provides a useful service in connecting the network more efficiently. However, when an attacker forwards only routing control messages, this attack might severely disrupt routing. For example, when used against an on-demand routing protocol such as DSR4 or AODV, a powerful application of the wormhole attack can be mounted by tunneling each ROUTE REQUEST packet directly to the target node of the REQUEST. This attack prevents any node from discovering routes more than two hops long.
Periodic protocols are also vulnerable to this kind of attack. For example, OLSR and TBRPF use HELLO packets for neighbor detection, so if an attacker tunnels to B all HELLO packets transmitted by A and tunnels to A all HELLO packets transmitted by B, then A and B will believe that they are neighbors, which would cause the routing protocol to fail to find routes when they aren’t actually neighbors.
The wormhole attack is also dangerous in other wireless applications. One example is any wireless access control system that is proximity based, such as wireless car keys or proximity- and token-based access control systems for PCs. In such systems, an attacker could relay authentication exchanges to gain unauthorized access.
Our solution to the wormhole attack is packet leashes. We consider specifically two types of packet leashes: geographical and temporal. The main idea is that by authenticating either an extremely precise timestamp or location information combined with a loose timestamp, a receiver can determine if the packet has traversed an unrealistic distance for the specific network technology used. Temporal leashes rely on extremely precise time synchronization and timestamps in each packet. We can approximate a packet’s travel time as the difference between the receive time and the timestamp. To be more conservative, however, a node can choose to add the maximum time synchronization error, assuming that the sender’s clock might be faster than the receiver’s.
拒绝翻译工具，求人工的啊!!大神 ，现身吧

Answer 1

The wormhole attack is a severe attack against ad hoc routing protocols that is particularly challenging to defend against; it can potentially cripple a range of ad hoc network routing protocols. In the wormhole attack, an attacker records packets (or bits) at one location in the network, tunnels them to another location, and retransmits them from there into the network. Most existing ad hoc network routing protocols that lack a mechanism to defend them against the wormhole attack would be unable to find routes longer than one or two hops, which severely disrupts communication. 虫洞攻击是一个严重的攻击，路由协议，是特别具有挑战性，抵御；它可以削弱一系列网络路由协议。在虫洞攻击，攻击者记录数据包（或位）在同一地点的网络，隧道到另一个位置，并转发到网络。现有的大多数网络路由协议，缺乏一种机制来保护他们免受虫洞攻击将无法fi钕路线长于1或2啤酒花，这严重破坏通信。If a wormhole attacker tunnels all packets through the wormhole honestly and reliably, no harm is done; the attacker actually provides a useful service in connecting the network more efficiently. However, when an attacker forwards only routing control messages, this attack might severely disrupt routing. For example, when used against an on-demand routing protocol such as DSR4 or AODV, a powerful application of the wormhole attack can be mounted by tunneling each ROUTE REQUEST packet directly to the target node of the REQUEST. This attack prevents any node from discovering routes more than two hops long.如果一个虫洞攻击隧道数据包通过虫洞诚实可靠，没有造成危害后果的；攻击者实际上提供了一个有用的服务，更有效地fi连接网络。然而，当一个攻击者只转发路由控制消息，这次袭击可能严重破坏路由。例如，当使用一个路由协议如dsr4或路由协议，一个强大的应用虫洞攻击可以安装在隧道每个路由请求数据包直接到目标节点的请求。这种攻击可以防止任何节点发现路线超过2跳。Periodic protocols are also vulnerable to this kind of attack. For example, OLSR and TBRPF use HELLO packets for neighbor detection, so if an attacker tunnels to B all HELLO packets transmitted by A and tunnels to A all HELLO packets transmitted by B, then A and B will believe that they are neighbors, which would cause the routing protocol to fail to find routes when they aren’t actually neighbors.周期性的协议，也容易受到这类攻击。例如，路由和tbrpf使用包来检测为邻居，所以如果攻击者隧道都喂所传送的数据包和隧道到所有你好所传送的数据包，然后，会相信他们是邻居，这将导致路由协议未能fi钕路线时，他们不实际上的邻居。The wormhole attack is also dangerous in other wireless applications. One example is any wireless access control system that is proximity based, such as wireless car keys or proximity- and token-based access control systems for PCs. In such systems, an attacker could relay authentication exchanges to gain unauthorized access.虫洞攻击也是危险的其他无线应用。一个例子是任何无线接入控制系统，是接近，如无线车钥匙或接近和象征性的访问控制系统的电脑。在这样的系统中，攻击者可以获得未经授权的访问认证交流继电器。Our solution to the wormhole attack is packet leashes. We consider specifically two types of packet leashes: geographical and temporal. The main idea is that by authenticating either an extremely precise timestamp or location information combined with a loose timestamp, a receiver can determine if the packet has traversed an unrealistic distance for the specific network technology used. Temporal leashes rely on extremely precise time synchronization and timestamps in each packet. We can approximate a packet’s travel time as the difference between the receive time and the timestamp. To be more conservative, however, a node can choose to add the maximum time synchronization error, assuming that the sender’s clock might be faster than the receiver’s.我们的解决方案的虫洞攻击数据包限制。我们认为，特别地fi类型分组的牵引：地理和时间。其主要思想是，通过认证的任何一个非常精确的时间戳或位置信息，结合一个松散的时间戳，接收器可以确定数据包已经走过一个不切实际的距离为fi网络技术。时间约束依靠非常精确的时间同步，时间戳每个数据包。我们可以近似的数据包的旅行时间之间的差异的时间和收到的时间戳。更为保守，然而，一个节点可以选择添加最大时间同步误差，假设发送方的时钟可能是速度快于接收器的。
可以了吧！大哥

Answer 2

虫洞攻击是一个严重的攻击，路由协议，是特别具有挑战性，抵御；它可以削弱一系列网络路由协议。在虫洞攻击，攻击者记录数据包（或位）在同一地点的网络，隧道到另一个位置，并转发到网络。现有的大多数网络路由协议，缺乏一种机制来保护他们免受虫洞攻击将无法fi钕路线长于1或2啤酒花，这严重破坏通信。

如果一个虫洞攻击隧道数据包通过虫洞诚实可靠，没有造成危害后果的；攻击者实际上提供了一个有用的服务，更有效地fi连接网络。然而，当一个攻击者只转发路由控制消息，这次袭击可能严重破坏路由。例如，当使用一个路由协议如dsr4或路由协议，一个强大的应用虫洞攻击可以安装在隧道每个路由请求数据包直接到目标节点的请求。这种攻击可以防止任何节点发现路线超过2跳。

周期性的协议，也容易受到这类攻击。例如，路由和tbrpf使用包来检测为邻居，所以如果攻击者隧道都喂所传送的数据包和隧道到所有你好所传送的数据包，然后，会相信他们是邻居，这将导致路由协议未能fi钕路线时，他们不实际上的邻居。

虫洞攻击也是危险的其他无线应用。一个例子是任何无线接入控制系统，是接近，如无线车钥匙或接近和象征性的访问控制系统的电脑。在这样的系统中，攻击者可以获得未经授权的访问认证交流继电器。

我们的解决方案的虫洞攻击数据包限制。我们认为，特别地fi类型分组的牵引：地理和时间。其主要思想是，通过认证的任何一个非常精确的时间戳或位置信息，结合一个松散的时间戳，接收器可以确定数据包已经走过一个不切实际的距离为fi网络技术。时间约束依靠非常精确的时间同步，时间戳每个数据包。我们可以近似的数据包的旅行时间之间的差异的时间和收到的时间戳。更为保守，然而，一个节点可以选择添加最大时间同步误差，假设发送方的时钟可能是速度快于接收器的。

Answer 3

蠹孔攻击是一种严重的攻击,特设路由协议是一项特别的挑战来防范;它可以潜在地削弱了一系列自组网路由协议。在虫洞攻击,攻击者记录包(或一些位),在一个地点在网络中,隧道到另一个位置,他们从那里retransmits进入网络。大多数现有的自组网路由协议,缺乏一种机制来保卫他们攻击虫孔将无法找到进攻路线超过一个或两个啤酒花,严重破坏了沟通。

如果一个虫孔攻击所有的包通过虫洞隧道诚实可靠,没有伤害,攻击者提供了一个有用的服务其实在连接网络更有效率。然而,当一个攻击者的前锋只有路由控制信息,这可能会严重破坏攻击路由。例如,当用来对付一个需路由协定如DSR4或AODV,一个强大的应用虫孔的攻击可以采用隧道每条线路直接请求包到目标节点的要求。这次袭击阻止任何节点发现两个多跳路线长。

周期协议也容易受到这类攻击。例如,使用和TBRPF OLSR的数据包的邻居检测你好,所以如果一个攻击者都喂包B中传播和隧道到所有喂包通过B,则A和B会相信他们是邻居,哪一行将产生路由协议的路线,不知道在他们没实际上的邻居。

蠹孔进攻也就是危险的其他无线应用。其中一个例子就是任何无线接入控制系统是基于附近,如无线的车钥匙或接近,token-based访问控制系统为电脑。在这种系统中,一个攻击者可以经由认证交流传递获得授权的访问。

我们的解决方案是乘客虫洞攻击包。我们认为特别两种类型的包乘客:地理和时间。主要思想是,要么一个极其精确的时间戳接受或位置信息结合一个松散的时间戳、接收机可以确定包已然是一个不切实际的距离为特定的网络技术应用。依靠极其精确时序乘客时间同步和时间邮戳每个包中。我们可以近似包的旅行时间之间的差别接收时间和时间戳。更保守,然而,一个节点可以选择加入同步误差的最长时间,假设发送者的时钟可能比接受者的。

Answer 4

意思大概是：蠹孔攻击是一种严重的攻击,特设路由协议是一项特别的挑战来防范;它可以潜在地削弱了一系列自组网路由协议。在虫洞攻击,攻击者记录包(或一些位),在一个地点在网络中,隧道到另一个位置,他们从那里retransmits进入网络。大多数现有的自组网路由协议,缺乏一种机制来保卫他们攻击虫孔攻击就找不到